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CASE COMMENTS
DUAL REPRESENTATION IN UNRELATED MATTERS PERMITTED WITH
CLIENT CONSENT WHEN FIRM CAN PROTECT CLIENTS'
BEST INTERESTS
/n/fed Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981)
In Un/fed Sewerage Agency v. Jelo Inc. ,' the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit rejected a per se rule against adverse multiple client
representation and clarified the appropriate preconditions to such rep-
resentation under the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).z
Jelco, a Utah corporation and the prime contractor on a construction
project in Oregon, approached Kobin & Meyer, a Portland law firm,
for representation in a suit against Ace Electric (Ace), its electrical sub-
contractor? Kobin & Meyer had represented Teeples & Thatcher,
Jelco's concrete subcontractor, as general counsel for over ten years.4
Attorney Meyer informed Jelco that the firm represented Teeples in a
potential dispute with Jelco and that the prime contractor should ob-
tain other counsel for its litigation with the electrical subcontractor.5
Meyer repeatedly told Jelco of Kobin & Meyer's intention to represent
Teeples in all matters and asked Jelco to reconsider whether it would
be in Jelco's best interest to obtain other counsel.6 Each time Jelco
expressed a desire to retain Meyer's representation in the Ace litigation
regardless of developments in the Teeples-Jelco dispute.7 Meanwhile,
1. 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. The District Court for the District of Oregon adopted the disciplinary rules of the State
Bar of Oregon. See 646 F.2d at 1342 n. 1. See also LR 3(d), OR. R. CT. 318 (West 1980). The
state bar adopted the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980) [hereinafter cited as
CODE]. See infra note 11.
3. Jelco provided materials from a different equipment supplier than stipulated in the Ace-
Jelco subcontract. Ace alleged that this changed the provisions of the subcontract and sought
additional remuneration from Jelco. 646 F.2d at 1342.
4. Kobin & Meyer also had experience representing other construction companies during
that time. Id.
5. Teeples had expressed discontent with the order and progress of cement work on the
project. Id. at 1343.
6. Jelco reevaluated Kobin & Meyer's representation after a potential settlement with Teep-
les was unsuccessful. After Jelco lost the liability issue in the Ace litigation and Teeples had fied
suit against them, Jelco again decided Meyer should continue representing them on the damages
issue in the Ace litigation. Id.
7. Id.
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Kobin & Meyer filed suit for Teeples against Jelco.8 Months later,
Jelco dismissed Kobin & Meyer from the Ace litigation and filed a mo-
tion to disqualify the firm from representing Teeples in its action
against Jelco.9 The district court denied Jelco's disqualification mo-
tion'0 based on alleged violations of Canons 4, 5, and 9 of the Code. I
8. Unified Sewerage Agency contracted with Jelco for Jelco's services as general contractor
on the project. Jelco, in turn, subcontracted with Teeples. Unified Sewerage Agency brought this
action on behalf of Teeples. Id. at 1342.
9. Id. at 1343. The disqualification motion forced the Unifted court to address the issue of
the attorney's alleged conffict of interest. By mandating judicial review, disqualification motions
may provide the parties with some protection regardless of whether the court grants the motion.
See, e.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975) (disqualification is the proper
remedy to ensure absolute fidelity and guard against abuse of confidential information); E.F. Hut-
ton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (mem.) (motion to disqualify is proper
procedure to bring conflict of interest to court's attention).
The purpose of disqualification is to protect the client, not to punish the attorney. See, e.g., City
of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 206 (N.D. Ohio) (ensures
attorney cannot prejudice client with confidential information), alfdmem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.
1977), ceri. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). See also W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d
Cir. 1976) (purpose not to punish errant attorney, but to protect other parties). See generally
Comment, Disqualfication of Counsel- Adverse Interests and Revolving Doors, 81 COLUM L. REV.
199, 201 (1981) (confidential information obtained from client may not be used to client's detri-
ment).
The courts balance several competing policy considerations in making the disqualification deci-
sion. They must try to preserve a person's right to choose counsel, protect the former client's
interest in preventing unauthorized use of confidential information previously disclosed to the
attorney, avoid disqualifying the attorney when the purpose of the motion is purely tactical, and
preserve the integrity of the profession. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir,
1978) (extremely important to maintain public confidence in persons involved in administration of
justice); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1973) (balance right to
choose counsel and maintenance of high standards of ethical professional responsibility); City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 196 (N.D. Ohio), (right to choose
counsel secondary to maintenance of high standards of attorney conduct and scrupulous adminis-
tration of justice), aff'dmenz, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
10. 646 F.2d at 1343-44. The district court's power to disqualify is incident to its power to
police the conduct of attorneys appearing before it. See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th
Cir. 1980); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil
Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Ceramco, Inc. v.
Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1975). But f Community Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (appellate courts should not act as overseers of
ethics); W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976) (court's business is to dispose
of litigation and not to oversee ethics, unless trial actually tainted by improper conduct).
11. CODE, supra note 2. Canon 4 states: "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and
Secrets of a Client." Canon 5 provides: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional
Judgement on Behalf of a Client." Canon 9 states: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appear-
ance of Impropriety."
The Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted by the ABA on August 12, 1969, and effective
on January 1, 1970, replaced the Canons of Professional Ethics (1908). Canons 4 and 5 are modi-
[Vol. 60:1155
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On review of Jelco's petition for a writ of mandamus12 the Ninth Cir-
fications of former Canons 6 and 37. See R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 65 (2d ed. 1970); Note, The
Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualifcation-Silver Chrysler Steers in New Direction, 44 FORD-
H -%Nt L. REv. 130, 130 n.2 (1975). Canon 9 has no counterpart in the former Canons. See Com-
ment, Ethical Considerations Wrhen an Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The Needfor a Realistic
1pplication of Canon Nine, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 525, 530-31 (1975).
The Code of Professional Responsibility consists of Canons, which express the general stan-
dards of professional conduct expected of lawyers; Ethical Considerations, which are aspirational,
ethical objectives for which attorneys should strive; and Disciplinary Rules, which are mandatory
and subject attorneys to disciplinary action for conduct contrary to their directives. See CODE,
supra note 2, Preliminary Statement. On March 11, 1975, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted
Canons 4, 5, and 9, and the accompanying Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules which
are identical to the Code of Professional Responsibility provisions cited above. The United States
District Court for the District of Oregon applies the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility
through Local Rule 3(d): "The members of the Bar of this Court shall be governed by and shall
observe the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Oregon State Bar. . . ." OR. R. CT. 318
(West 1980). See also FEDERAL LOCAL RULES FOR CIVIL AND ADMIRALTY PROCEEDINGS (1981);
COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1977).
12. Jelco actually appealed the denial of its motion to disqualify. The circuit courts are di-
vided on appropriate procedure for appellate review of orders denying motions to disqualify. At
the beginning of 1981, five circuits held that litigants had a right to appeal the interlocutory order
rather than wait until final judgment to appeal. In Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (collateral order exception to the Final Judgment Rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1976)), the Supreme Court implicitly established a three-part test to determine the availability of
appeals by right. A litigant can automatically bring an interlocutory appeal if he shows that the
order denying the motion to disqualify conclusively determines the question in dispute, resolves
an important question separate from the main action, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment. If a litigant meets this test, the order is final and appealable under § 1291
even though it does not end the litigation.
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981), af'g in part and vacating in part
In re Multipiece Rim Products Liability Litigation, 612 F.2d 377 (8th Cir.) (en bane), a unani-
mous court held that the denial of a motion to disqualify counsel does not meet the third criterion.
The Court ruled that delaying appeal from the denial of the motion until final judgment would
not prejudice the movant. The Court held that orders denying attorney disqualification motions
were not appealable. Id. at 376-77.
A second means to obtain judicial review of an order denying disqualification is to obtain both
certification from the district court and permission from the circuit court. 28 U.S.C § 1292(b)
(1976). See. e.g., In re Multipiece Rim Products Liability Litigation, 612 F.2d 377, 378 (8th Cir.)
(en banc) (movant failed to obtain permission of the circuit court), af'd inpart and vacated in part
sub nom. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell
Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 606 (8th Cir. 1977) (movant must use certification process), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 905 (1978); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516. 521 (9th Cir. 1964) (dicta) (appeal by certification
proper), clarified by, 370 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1966).
Mandamus is also used to appeal disqualification denials. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d
994, 996 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (mandamus alowed); Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592
F.2d 290, 296 (6th Cir. 1979) (dicta that petition for a writ of mandamus granted only in the
exceptional case); Community Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 546 F.2d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
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cuit affirmed' 3 and held: The Code permits dual representation of cli-
ents who knowingly consent when the matters are unrelated and it is
obvious that the firm can adequately represent the best interests of each
client. 14
Canon 415 of the Code applies when an attorney represents an inter-
est adverse to that of a former client. 6 Courts apply the substantial
relationship test, first promulgated in T C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. ,7 when ruling on disqualification motions. The test
mandates disqualification if the, attorney's present representation is
substantially related to the subject matter of the prior representation of
(mandamus allows court flexibility; prevents injustice while maintaining the final judgment rule),
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976) (All Writs Act).
The Unfled court considered Jelco's appeal from the ordinarily nonappealable disqualification
denial to be a petition for a writ of mandamus. In determining whether to grant extraordinary
relief, the Ninth Circuit used a five-part test set forth in Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557
F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977). 646 F.2d at 1344. The propriety of granting mandamus for
interlocutory review of orders denying disqualification of counsel is questionable, however, in
light of two recent Supreme Court decisions. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449
U.S. 368, 373-74 (1981) (immediate review not necessary because a new trial will correct injustice);
Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam) (when matter is discre-
tionary, litigant's right to mandamus is not necessary because review of the propriety of the order
for a new trial by direct appeal after final judgment provides full redress). The Unified court
distinguished Unifled from Firestone by stating that the irreparable harm that would result from
delay in review of Un/fed was too great to force the parties to wait until final judgment to appeal
denial of the motion. 646 F.2d at 1344 n.2. The Firestone court rejected the same contention. 449
U.S. at 378 (quoting Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The Unfled court also granted mandamus because the case was one of first impression in the
ninth circuit and it wanted to establish a clear standard for the profession and the public to follow.
646 F.2d at 1344.
13. 646 F.2d at 1352. The district court's ruling will be affirmed unless it is clearly erroneous,
see Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1979); Woods v.
Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976), or an abuse of discretion, see Govern-
ment of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978); Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co.,
534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Kroungold v. Tri-
ester, 521 F.2d 763, 765 n.2 (3d Cir. 1975); Greene v. Singer Co., 461 F.2d 242, 243 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
14. 646 F.2d at 1344 n.3, 1348-49 (1981).
15. See supra note 11. See also CODE, supra note 2, EC 4-1 to -6, DR 4-101.
16. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam); Akerly v. Red Barn System, Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 544 (3d Cir. 1977); Gas-a-tron v.
Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Redd
v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 1975); American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d
982, 984 (3d Cir. 1975).
17. 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Courts apply the substantial relationship test
under Canon 4 of the 1970 Code of Professional Responsibility even though the test preceded the
Code by 17 years. See, e.g., supra note 16 and infra notes 18-24.
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his former client.' 8 Courts applying the substantial relationship test as-
sume that the attorney obtained confidential information as a by-prod-
uct of the previous relationship 9 that would damage the former client's
interests if used against him.2" Disqualification encourages the free
flow of information that is necessary for the attorney to represent a
client adequately2 by ensuring that confidences or secrets22 cannot
18. See, e.g., Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979)
(trademark infringement cases); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976) (patent
infringement cases); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972) (plaintifis
attorney previously employed by defendant's sister corporation), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973);
Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y.) (mer.) (defendant's
former regional counsel representing plaintiff), afl'd, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
19. See, e.g., NCK Org., Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1976) (presume attorney
received confidential information; possible use of confidences necessitates disqualification); Cer-
amco, Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975) (disqualification proper to
prevent possibility of inadvertent use of confidential information); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex,
Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973) (strict prophylactic rule to protect client); United States v.
Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964) (confidential information presumed to have passed).
20. See 113 F. Supp. 265.
No client should ever be concerned with the possible use against him in future litiga-
tion of what he may have revealed to his attorney. Matters disclosed by clients under the
protective seal of the attorney-client relationship and intended in their defense should
not be used as weapons of offense.
Id. at 269. See also Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1980) (use of confidences
disclosed in prior attorney-client relationship prevented by disqualification because possible
breach of confidence would harm client); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp.,
559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1977) (no inquiry whether attorney intends to, or is likely to, use
damaging disclosures against his former client); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,
570-71 (2d Cir. 1973) (unfair for attorney to use confidential information against former client).
21. Ethical Consideration 4-1 states that:
A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must
be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer
should be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his
client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system . . . . The observance of the
ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client
not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the
client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.
CODE, supra note 2, EC 4-1. See also Emle Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir.
1973) (high ethical standards permit client to discuss problems in detail without fear of a breach of
confidence); McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 175-77 (E. Cleary 2d ed.)
1972) (attorney must be fully informed about client's case to function effectively, and preventing
the attorney from using the information against the client encourages full disclosure). Ethical
Consideration 4-4 states that: "The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obli-
gation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike
the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or the fact
that others share the knowledge .... " CODE, supra note 2, EC 4-4. Thus the client, the holder
of the attorney-client privilege, can silence the attorney from ever repeating statements made con-
fidentially within the scope of the relationship.
In addition to the evidentiary attorney-client privilege, the attorney has an ethical duty to main-
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later prejudice the client.23 Disqualification is also necessary to uphold
the ethical standards of the profession.24
Under the original substantial relationship test,25 once an attorney-
client relationship is proven by the former client,26 there is an irrebut-
table presumption that confidential information has been passed.27
This presumption mandates automatic disqualification of counsel from
adverse representation.28 Courts have developed, however, exceptions
tain his client's information, secrets, and confidences. See, e.g., Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Res-
taurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1979). See also cases cited infra note 23.
The attorney has an ethical duty to keep all information regarding a client confidential regard-
less of where the attorney obtained the information. Thus, information has a broader meaning
than "confidences and secrets." The ethical duty provides greater protection for a client than the
attorney-client privilege. See CODE, supra note 2, EC 4-4.
22. See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1980); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,
478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973). The Code provides in part:
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege... .
and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional relationship...
the disclosure of which would. . . be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client. . . . but only after a full
disclosure to them.
CODE, supra note 2, DR 4-101 (Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client).
23. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1978) (confi-
dences disclosed in one matter harmful to client in second matter); Penwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc.,
85 F.R.D. 264, 269 (D. Del. 1980) (preservation of confidence overrides search for truth). See also
supra note 20.
24. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 753 (2d
Cir. 1975) (maintain the highest ethical standards of professional responsibility); Hull v. Celanese
Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir. 1975) (maintain scrupulous administration of justice); City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 196 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (maintain
integrity of bar), aI'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978);
Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. Del. 1980) (retain public trust in integrity
of bar). See generally H. DRuNKER, LEGAL ETHICS 105 (1953); R. WIsE, supra note 11, at 258.
25. The court declined to pierce the protective cloak surrounding the attorney-client relation-
ship to verify whether the client conveyed confidences to counsel. 113 F. Supp. at 268-69.
26. Proof that an attorney-client relationship existed is a prerequisite to disqualification
under Canons 4, 5 or 9. See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 1980) (relationship may
be informal); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978)
(relationship may exist regardless of lack of compensation); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co.,
436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971) (relationship necessary for disqualification); City of Cleveland
v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 207 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (bond counsel merely
a scrivener not an advocate, therefore, no attorney-client relationship), af'dmem., 573 F.2d 1310
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 558 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir. 1978);
Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc., 546
F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976).
28. See Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1979) (find
ings of prior representation and substantive relationship mandate disqualification); Government
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to the per se rule of T C. Theatre Corp. 29 in response to the increasing
number of disqualification motions filed solely for tactical purposes
such as delay.3" Some courts narrow the substantive grounds for dis-
qualification to instances in which both representations involve the
same issue or subject matter.31 Others apply a rebuttable presumption
that the prior client communicated confidential information to the at-
torney.32 Courts that allow rebuttal must analyze the facts to deter-
of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978) (disqualification follows from proof
of attorney-client relationship); Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d
250, 252 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (dicta that attorney is disqualified once former client shows
representations are substantially related); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
345 F. Supp. 93, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (per se disqualification).
29. 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
30. The Second Circuit in Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1980) (en
banc), racated, 439 U.S. 1106 (1981) stated that while the court could not precisely determine the
number of disqualification motions filed, it had a "clear impression that they have substantially
grown in number." Id. at 437. The court reviewed eleven disqualification cases between 1975 and
1980. Three appeals were also terminated before review in 1978 alone. Id. at 437-38 n.9. The
trial on the merits in Armstrong was delayed from June 1978 until January 1981 while the parties
contested the disqualification motion. Id. at 438. See also Gould v. Lumonics Research Ltd., 495
F. Supp. 294, 297 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (motion to disqualify is a litigation strategy); North Am. Foreign
Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 FR.D. 293, 295-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (motion frivolous, penalty
assessed against movant). See generaly Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977); W.T.
Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1976); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527
F2d 1288, 1289 (2d Cir. 1975); LeFrak v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136, 1138-39 (2d Cir.
1975); J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court's decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981)
should reduce the tactical appeal of disqualification motions. The Court held that certification
and petition for writ of mandamus were the only means to obtain interlocutory review of orders
denying disqualification motions. There is no longer an automatic right to interlocutory appeal.
The effects of dilatory motions are thereby reduced, in most cases, to the time in which the district
court decides the motion. See supra note 12.
31. See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978)
(substantial relationship test met only if issues are identical or overlap substantially); Ceramco,
Inc. v. Lee Pharmaceuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 1975) (subject matters almost identical;
substantially related); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 572 (2d Cir. 1973) (identi-
cal issues).
32. See, e.g., Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (attor-
ney had access to confidential files but court inquiry determined that he did not actually obtain
confidential information), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Rossworm v. Pittsburg Coming Corp.,
468 F. Supp. 168, 171-72 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (court did not make presumption); City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 209 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (presumption rebutted
by evidence that no disclosure of confidential information occurred), ad mem., 573 F.2d 1310
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
The rebuttable presumption is more consistent with practical realities of modern legal practice
than is the irrebuttable presumption. Today large law firms represent multinational corporations.
Attorneys, especially young associates, often work for more than one firm during their careers. As
such, an attorney may work for firms representing competitors within an industry. It is unrealistic
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mine whether disqualification is appropriate.33 Attorneys who prove
nonexposure to confidential information are then immunized from
disqualification.34
The Code allows an attorney to use information obtained from a for-
mer client if the attorney receives the client's consent after full disclo-
sure.35 The Fifth Circuit stated in In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity
Litigation36 that a former client could consent to adverse representation
by his former attorney. 7 In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil
Corp. ,a3 however, the Seventh Circuit held that a client's consent could
to impute knowledge of all the confidential information in a firm's files to each attorney in the
firm. Such imputation would infringe on an attorney's mobility and career prospects as well as a
client's right to choose counsel. The rebuttable presumption standard maintains public respect in
the judicial system by initially presuming that an attorney acquired confidential information. The
presumption then realistically allows an attorney to demonstrate that he was insulated from confi-
dential information. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,
209-11 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aj'dmem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 587-88
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aftd, 581 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Kaufman, The Former Governunent
Attorney andthe Canons ofzrofessionalEthics, 70 HARV. L. REv. 657, 666-67 (1957); Note, Attor-
ney's Conflict of Interests: Representation ofInterest Adverse to That ofFormer Client, 55 B.U.L.
REv. 61, 65 (1975); Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and nlutra.
Firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALe L.J. 1058, 1071 (1964). See generally Note, supra note 11.
33. Akerly v. Red Barn System, Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1977) (carefully scrutinize
all facts and circumstances to determine whether conduct warrants disqualification); United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (conclusion in ethics case can be
reached only after a painstaking factual analysis); Pernwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264,
269 (D. Del. 1980) (careful factual analysis).
34. See, e.g., Akerly v. Red Barn System, Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 544 (3d Cir. 1977) (relation
between attorneys not active where no confidential information had passed); Gas-a-tron v. Union
Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (attorney proved that he did not receive any
confidential information in prior representation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1975) (differentiate for
disqualification purposes lawyers who became heavily involved in facts of case and those who
entered briefly on the periphery for a limited purpose solely relating to legal issues). See also
supra note 31.
35. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) states: "A lawyer may reveal (1) confidences or secrets with
the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them." CODE, supra
note 2, DR 4-101(C). See also infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
36. 530 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1976).
37. Id. at 89. The Second Circuit, in Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit
Management Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954), noted that a client is most likely to consent
to adverse use of prior disclosure when he knows it will not harm him in the new case. See also E.
F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 400 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (mem.) (second representation
proper if informed consent received from client; court ruled that no such consent had been
obtained.)
38. 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978).
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not justify the use of confidential information against the client.39 The
court relied on Ethical Consideration 4-5,4o and ruled that an attorney
could use confidential information for personal use, but not against a
former client in a lawsuit.4 Courts interpret the failure of a former
client to object to adverse use of confidential information as an implied
consent to such use.42  This result assumes, however, that the client
would object if the attorney obtained potentially damaging information
in the former representation.43
Canon 5 of the Code applies when an attorney represents interests
adverse to those of a client represented contemporaneously in another
matter.' Canon 5 imposes a stricter standard for disqualification than
39. Id. at 228-29. The court stated that it was inconceivable that a former client would want
prior disclosures to harm his present case.
40. Ethical Consideration 4-5 states: "A lawyer should not use information acquired in the
course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client and a lawyer should not
use, except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, such information for his own pur-
poses." CODE, supra note 2, EC 4-5.
41. See also Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough,,inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 273 (D. Del. 1980).
42. See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954) (dictum) (lack of a challenge constitutes implied consent); North Am.
Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (movant should have
known that all parties acquiesced in the plaintiffs attorney's dual role).
43. See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954) (lack of challenge indicated former client's belief that attorney's use
of prior disclosures could not damage ex-client's present case); Rossworm v. Pittsburgh Coming
Corp., 468 F. Supp. 168, 174-75 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (former client's failure to object to adverse repre-
sentation constituted consent). See also IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978);
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); City of Cleveland v. Cleve-
land Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 206-07 (N.D. Ohio 1976) a'dmem., 573 F.2d 1310
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264,
271-72 (D. Del. 1980); supra note 9. Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d
221, 228 (7th Cir. 1978) (public policy dictates that client cannot consent to adverse use of confi-
dential information).
Courts determine whether to apply Canon 4 or Canon 5 as of the date that the complaint is filed
in the later, adverse representation. This prevents an attorney from filing a complaint against a
client he presently represents, withdrawing from representation of that client, and then claiming
that the more lenient former client standard of Canon 4 applies. Courts apply Canon 5 in such
circumstances. Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976); Fund of
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84, 95 (S.D.N.Y.) (mem.), aj'd 567 F.2d 225
(2d Cir. 1977); Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 269-71 (D. Del. 1980).
44. Under Canon 4, representation adverse to a former client is impermissible only when
there is a possibility that an attorney will use information confided to him in a prior relationship
to defeat his ex-client in the present litigation. See supra notes 25-28. Under Canon 5, any repre-
sentation adverse to a present client requires disqualification. Canon 5 dictates that an attorney
serve each client with undiluted loyalty. This is impossible when an attorney represents a second
party who brings suit against a preexisting client. Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592
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Canon 4 by providing that any representation adverse to the interests
of an existing client is prima facie improper.45 Canon 5 requires that
an attorney represent each client with undivided loyalty46 and
fidelity.47 The attorney has a fiduciary duty 8 to advocate and cham-
pion his client's cause49 zealously,5° without attempting to serve ad-
verse interests.'
F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1979) (balance shifts significantly towards disqualification if representation
against an existing client rather than a former client); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d
1384, 1386-87 (2d Cir. 1976) (attorney must show that he does not have actual or apparent con-
flicting loyalties when bringing suit against a preexisting client). Fewer reported cases arise under
Canon 5 than Canon 4 because of the difference in clarity between the two standards. In most
instances it is obvious that an attorney should not litigate against an existing client. Under Canon
4, whether two representations are substantially related or whether confidential information has
passed are debatable questions. Attorneys are therefore more likely to represent parties opposing
former clients rather than existing clients. See supra note II.
45. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978); Grievance Comm. v.
Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 65, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (1964).
46. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976); Haffer v.
Farkas, 498 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1974); Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F. Supp. 30, 38 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), moadedon other ground, 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973).
47. See, e.g., In re Farr, 264 Ind. 153, 165, 340 N.E.2d 777, 784-85 (1976); In re Kamp, 40
N.J. 588, 594, 194 A.2d 236, 240 (1963).
In Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976), an attorney was a partner in
two law firms; one located in Buffalo, the other in New York City. The Buffalo firm represented
the defendant, Cinerama, against charges of conspiracy to monopolize theatre licensing and film
distribution in the Rochester area. At the same time, the New York City firm attempted to repre-
sent plaintiff, Cinema 5, in the Southern District Court for New York. The allegations included
conspiracy to take over the plaintiff's corporation by stock acquisitions in order to monopolize and
restrain competition in the theatre industry. The Second Circuit affirmed the order disqualifying
the New York City firm from representation of Cinema 5. The court stated it was irrelevant
whether the two cases were substantially related. The inquiry focused on whether there was a
possibility or an appearance that the dual representation would adversely affect the attorney's
loyalty orjudgment. In the absence of full disclosure and consent, the court noted that it would be
a rare case that an attorney could properly represent conflicting interests that could affect his
professional obligations to each client. Because the attorney spent half of his time defending and
half of his time suing Cinerama, the court held that the disqualification order was not an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 1385-87.
48. Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 65, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (1964).
49. In re Farr, 264 Ind. 153, 169-70, 340 N.E.2d 777, 787 (1976). See also Trone v. Smith,
621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1980); Cinerama 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d
Cir. 1976); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 345 F. Supp. 93, 99 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
50. See Sapienza v. New York News, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 676, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 1 re
Hershberger, 288 Or. 559, 567, 606 P.2d 623, 626 (1980) (per curiam); In re Mumford, 285 Or. 559,
561-62, 591 P.2d 1377, 1377-78 (1979) (en banc) (per curiam); In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 475, 584
P.2d 284, 292 (1978) (en banc) (per curiam).
51. See sufpra note 10. Ethical Consideration 5-15 states:
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple clients
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An attorney has a duty to exercise independent professional judg-
ment on behalf of each client.52 An obligation to assert a claim on
behalf of one client against another whom he has a duty to defend
compromises the attorney's independent judgment.53 An attorney may
represent dual conflicting interests only by fulfilling the two-part test of
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C). 54 Under Rule 5-105(C) an attorney may
represent multiple clients if he first obtains consent from each client
after full disclosure of the potential adverse effects of dual representa-
tion. It must also be obvious to the attorney that he can adequately
represent each client's interests."
having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility that his
judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues the employ-
ment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation. . . . If a
lawyer accepted such employment and the interests did become actually differing, he
would have to withdraw from employment with. . . resulting hardship on the clients;
and for this reason it is preferable that he refuse the employment initially.
CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-15.
52. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978) (independent professional
judgment impaired by adverse representation of existing client); Moritz v. Medical Protective Co.,
428 F. Supp. 865, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (attorney's judgment adversely affected by client's suit
against him).
53. Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976) (improper for attor-
ney to defend client in one action and simultaneously sue same client in a separate litigation). See
supra notes 44 & 47. See also CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 6 (1908). Former Ca-
non 6 stated:
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a
lawyer represents conflicting interests when, on behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets and confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employ-
ment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to
which confidence has been reposed.
Id., repealed bj, CODE, supra note 2. See H. DRINKER, supra note 24, at 311.
54. Disciplinary Rule 5-105 provides in part:
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by
his representation of another client, . . . except to the extent permitted under DR5-
105(C).
(C) [A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclo-
sure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent pro-
fessional judgment on behalf of each.
CODE, supra note 2, DR5-105.
55. Failure to comply with either part of DR5-105(C)'s test results in disqualification. A.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 37 (1976); ABA Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics, Informal Op. No. 1282 (1973), 1235 (1972); ABA Committee on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. No. 331 (1972).
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Canon 6 of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics did not contain
an obviously adequate representation requirement.16 Rather, it merely
required mutual consent after full disclosure." Consequently, case law
under DR 5-105(C) of the 1970 Code relies primarily on the consent
after full disclosure test with sparse mention of the obviously adequate
representation requirement s.5  The Oregon Supreme Court, however,
in In re Porter59 stated that a literal interpretation of DR 5-105(C)
would make representation of conflicting interests nearly impossible.
The court proposed a per se rule that would prevent dual representa-
tion of conflicting interests in all cases. The court postulated that once
an adverse effect on the exercise of an attorney's independent judgment
is shown, it would not be obvious that he could adequately represent
each client's best interests.6 0
Unlike the factors constituting obvious adequate representation, the
requirements of full disclosure are well developed by case law. A law-
yer must inform each client of his relationship with the other client, the
scope of that representation, and all possible consequences of dual rep-
resentation.6 He must explain the nature of the conflict in sufficient
detail for the client to understand that it may be to his advantage to
retain independent counsel.6 2
56. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) is a stricter standard for disqualification than former Canon
6. Canon 6 dealt with direct conflicts of interest between an attorney's clients. Disciplinary Rule
5-105(C) applies not only to direct conflicts of interest, but also to cases in which an attorney's
representation of one client will adversely affect his loyalty and judgment in representation of
another client. Compare former Canon 6, supra note 53, with Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C), supra
note 54.
57. See supra note 53.
58. Occasionally courts have stated that it is not "obvious" that an attorney can adequately
represent two clients, but no case has established the requirements of obviously adequate repre-
sentation. See Sapienza v. New York News, 481 F. Supp. 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (not obvious
that attorney can adequately represent both parties in antitrust case); Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp.
1361, 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (not obvious that attorney can adequately represent two counterclaim-
ant defendants).
59. 283 Or. 517, 584 P.2d 744 (1978) (en banc) (per curiam).
60. Id at 528 n.5, 584 P.2d at 749 n.5.
61. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 396-97 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (mem.)
(amount of disclosure required varies with facts and circumstances; attorney must disclose infor-
mation sufficient for client to make informed choice); In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 595, 194 A.2d 236,
240-41 (1963) (attorney should inform clients of possible future conflicts and reveal which client
he intends to represent should a conflict develop). See also CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-16, EC 5-19;
H. DrRiNKR, supra note 24, at 105, 120-21.
62. See, e.g., In re Boivin, 271 Or. 419, 424, 533 P.2d 171, 174 (1975) (en bane) (per curiam)
(attorneys must convey reasons why independent counsel's undiluted loyalty serves client's best
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Once an attorney shows that he has made full disclosure to each cli-
ent, the inquiry shifts to the issue of consent.63 Conduct that would
otherwise result in disqualification is permissible if each client consents
after full disclosure of the nature and consequences of the dual repre-
sentation. 64 Public policy or undue prejudice to one party may, how-
ever, mandate disqualification despite each client's consent. 65
Furthermore, courts apply a per se rule that any representation against
an existing client is improper without the client's consent.66 To prevent
future conflicts of interest,67 courts grant disqualification motions
interest%). See also CODE, supra note 2, EC 5-19; L. PATTERSON & E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFES-
\fON or- LAW 232, 235 (1971); R. WIsE, supra note 11.
63. A client cannot knowingly waive his right to independent counsel without full disclosure.
See EF. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 397 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (mem.); In re Kamp, 40
N.J. 588, 595, 194 A.2d 236, 240 (1963); In re Boivin, 271 Or. 419, 424, 533 P.2d 171, 174 (1975)
(en banc) (per curiam). Full disclosure to only one client is insufficient and will prompt disqualifi-
cation. See E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 400-01 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (mem.)
(attorney who did not disclose or obtain former client's consent to adverse representation ordered
to withdraw from case); In re Kali, 116 Ariz. 285, 286-88, 569 P.2d 227, 228-29 (1977) (en banc)
(improper for attorney to arrange loan between clients without fully informing each); In re Farr,
264 Ind. 153, 162-69, 340 N.E.2d 777, 779-87 (1976) (ethical violation where law firm represents
plaintiff for personal injury and also represents defendant's liability insurer, unless firm fully dis-
closes each representation to each client); In re Kamp, 40 N.J. 588, 595, 194 A.2d 236, 240 (1963)
(attorney who represents buyer and seller, without informing buyer, violates Code).
64. See, e.g., Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1979)
(representing competitors); Kagel v. First Commonwealth Co., 534 F.2d 194, 195 (9th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam) (court allowed representation of potential conflicting interests in bankruptcy action
because there was full disclosure and implied consent); Gould v. Lumonics Research, Ltd., 495 F.
Supp. 294, 297 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (proper for patent assignee to represent consenting patent holder in
infringement suit).
65. See, e.g., In re A & B, 44 N.J. 331, 333, 209 A.2d 101, 103 (1965) (per curiam) (improper
to represent land developer and municipality even with consent); Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d
368, 378-79, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 946 (dictum that if attorney represented
insurer and insured, court would disqualify attorney even if consent obtained); Jedwabny v. Phila-
delphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 236-37, 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957) (conflict so adverse that attor-
ney can not represent both sides), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958). See generalor H. DRINKER,
supra note 24, at 106 & 120 n.16; R. WisE, supra note 11, at 256; ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics, Informal Op. No. 1157 (1970); ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Formal Op., No.
132 (1935). Despite judicial decisions disallowing consent, the ABA has repeatedly refused to
delete the consent clause. H. DRINKER, supra note 24, at 120 n. 16 (1953). See CODE, supra note 2,
DR 4-101(C)(1) & 5-105(C).
66. See infra note 69.
67. Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In Rice, the firm that repre-
sented the plaintiffs attempted to represent two corporations who were joined as counterclaim
defendants. The court prevented the firm from undertaking representation of the counterclaim
defendants. There was a potential conflict of interest because the counterclaim defendants might
crossclaim or file an independent lawsuit against the plaintiffs. In order to advise the counter-
claim defendants adequately concerning their legal rights, the firm would have had to suggest
Washington University Open Scholarship
1168 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:1155
under the per se rule even if the attorney did not obtain any damaging
confidential information and the subject matters of the two representa-
tions are unrelated.6" When no vital public interest is at stake and a
client has given his consent after full disclosure, however, attorneys can
represent clients with adverse interests.69
The purpose of Canon 9 is to maintain public confidence in the legal
system. 70 Attorneys must avoid not only actual wrongdoing, but also
action detrimental to the interests of their other clients, the plaintiffs. Disqualification prevented
the conflict from arising. The firm's loyalty to the plaintiffs thus remained undiluted and they
remained free to exercise their professional judgment without competing pressures. Id at 1373-
76. See also In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413,415 (Utah 1978) (Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A) designed to
prevent even potential conflicts between an attorney's clients). See supra note 51.
68. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 1978) (labor and antitrust repre-
sentations totally unrelated); Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 65, 203 A.2d 82, 84
(1964) (cannot sue client even when no relationship between the two cases); In re Kushinsky, 53
N.J. 1, 3-4, 247 A.2d 665, 666 (1968) (per curiam) (irrelevant that subject matters totally unrelated,
disqualify); In re Hedrick, 258 Or. 70, 74-75, 481 P.2d 71, 73 (1971) (en banc) (per curiam) (dis-
qualification even though no confidential information passed concerning subject matter of present
adverse representation); In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 414-15 (Utah 1978) (improper to represent
client in a criminal action while simultaneously suing that client, on behalf of another client, in a
civil action).
69. See, e.g., Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1979) (no
disqualification because movant knowingly consented to representation of its competitors by op-
ponent's law firm); Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (no wrongdoing because firm fully advised each client and neither objected to dual repre-
sentation); Gould v. Lumonics Research, Ltd., 495 F. Supp. 294, 297 (N.D. I11. 1980) (enthusiastic
consent of all the affected clients bars disqualification); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illu-
minating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 202 (N.D. Ohio) (movant's consent to firm's dual role constitutes
waiver and movant is estopped from revoking consent to move for disqualification order), ajf'd
mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); Fulton v. Woodford, 26
Ariz. App. 17, 20,545 P.2d 979,982 (1976) (dual representation of insurance company and insured
proper because consent given).
In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. the court discussed waiver and estoppel
as justifications for adverse representation after full disclosure and consent. 440 F. Supp. at 212-
13. Although waiver and estoppel are distinct concepts, the legal effect of each was identical in
Ciy of Cleveland. Estoppel is applied when one person detrimentally relies on another's conduct.
The law prevents repudiation of that conduct because of the unfairness to those who acted reason-
ably in reliance thereon. Waiver is the intentional, voluntary abandonment of a known legal
right. See Matsuo Yoshida v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 240 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1957).
70. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 1980) (preserve highest ethical standards in
profession); Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976) (ensure ethical
conduct by attorneys to ensure retention of public trust in judicial system); General Motors Corp.
v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 649 (2d Cir. 1974) (public trust in administration of justice
reason for Canon 9's appearance of evil doctrine); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d
1382, 1386 (3d Cir. 1972) (court and bar must supervise attorneys to maintain public confidence),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
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the appearance of impropriety.7' Disqualifications based solely on Ca-
non 9 are uncommon72 but can serve as an alternative basis for disqual-
ification.73 A literal interpretation of Canon 9 would lead to a per se
prohibition of all representation against a client, notwithstanding the
Code sections authorizing consent to adverse representation. Thus,
many courts have cautioned against using Canon 9 to repeal Discipli-
nary Rule 5-105(C).7 4
Canons 4, 5, and 9 mandate disqualification in close cases in order to
maintain public respect for the judicial system. 7 An attorney's good
faith is no defense to the disqualification motion.76 For minor ethical
71. IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 293 (3d Cir. 1978) (maintain public confidence in
judicial system by disqualification when attorney's conduct appears improper); Gas-a-tron v.
Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324-25 (9th Cir.) (dictum that disqualification for appearance of
impropriety maintains public confidence in legal profession), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976);
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1976) (improper for class
action representative to appoint his firm as class attorney); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528
F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d Cir. 1976) (disqualification because attorney represented conflicting interests
by suing a client he represented in a separate action); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469
F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972) (improper acts and failure to avoid appearance of improper acts
justifies attorney's disqualification).
72. Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1090-92 (3d Cir. 1976) (attorney class
representative prevented from appointing his firm as class counsel).
73. Canon 9 is often combined with an allegation of a violation of Canon 4. See, e.g., Bren-
nan's Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurants, Inc., 590 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1979); Schloetter v. Railoc, Inc.,
546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973);
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973).
74. See, e.g., Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1976) (court
refused literal interpretation of Canon 9 that would require disqualification for mere appearance
of impropriety); International Elec. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975) (court
cautioned against using Canon 9 to disqualify in all cases simply because another canon, ethical
consideration, or disciplinary rule does not proscribe the challenged conduct); City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 205-06 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (Canon 9 should not
be broadly applied in the disqualification setting), af'dmem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). See also CODE, supra note 2, DR4-10(C)(1). See also supra note 51.
75. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978)
(doubt about existence of conflict of interest requires disqualification); IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579
F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978) (doubt resolved in favor of disqualification); Hull v. Celanese Corp.,
513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975) (resolve any doubt by disqualification of counsel); Chugach Elec.
Ass'n. v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441,444 (9th Cir. 1966) (where abuse of confidential
information or conflict of interest is alleged, public interest requires disqualification in case of
doubt), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1967).
76. See, e.g., Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973); Richardson
v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973);
Chugach Elec. Ass'n. v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 820 (1967); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 397-98 (S.D. Tex. 1969)
(mem.); In re Porter, 283 Or. 517, 529, 584 P.2d 774, 750 (1978) (en banc) (per curiam).
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violations, some courts advocate disciplinary action against the attor-
ney rather than disqualification which may also harm the client.7 7
In Un/fled Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc. ,78 the Ninth Circuit applied
Canon,5, the "present client" standard of undivided loyalty, correcting
the district court's use of Canon 4's substantial relationship test.79 The
court ruled that when an attorney takes a position adverse to that of a
present client, an adverse effect is presumed and necessitates disqualifi-
cation under Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B)."0 The court required attor-
ney compliance with the two-part consent test of full disclosure and
obvious adequate representation to prevent disqualification." The
court held that attorney Meyer clearly fulfilled the consent require-
ment. Jelco had full knowledge of the longstanding relationship be-
tween Teeples & Thatcher and Kobin & Meyer when it retained the
firm. As a result of this informed waiver,82 and each party's good faith
reliance on that waiver, the court estopped Jelco from revoking its
77. W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1976) (violation of ethics does not
automatically result in disqualification); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 435 F.
Supp. 84, 99 (S.D.N.Y.) (dictum) (mem.) (do not always dismiss suit because of attorney miscon-
duct), a'd, 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977).
The main action is delayed while the disqualification motion is on appeal. If disqualification
results, the court will lose the time and energy it has expended on the matter or case. The party
that suffers disqualification must incur the additional expense of retaining another attorney if it
wishes to litigate the case. See generally O'Dea, The Lawyer-Client Relationsho Reconsidered
Methodsfor Avoiding Conflicts ofInterest, Malpractice Liability, and Disqualidcation, 48 GEo.
WAsH. L. REV. 692, 693 (1980); Developments in the Law, Conflicts ofInterest, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1244, 1471 (1981).
78. 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
79. The district court determined that Jelco was a former client of Meyer's because Meyer
did not represent Jelco at the time of trial and therefore applied Canon 4 to deny the motion to
disqualify. The Ninth Circuit reached the same result applying Canon 5. The proper ethical
standard to apply is determined as of the date Meyers filed the Teeples complaint. The present
client standard was the proper test because Meyer simultaneously represented Teeples and Jelco
when he filed suit for Teeples against Jelco. 646 F.2d at 1344-45, 1345 n.4. See stpra notes 43-45
and accompanying text.
80. 646 F.2d at 1345. The court agreed with the Third Circuit's decision in IBM Corp. v.
Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978), that an adverse effect of dual representation need not be
specifically proven. See Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) supra at note 54. See also supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
81. 646 F.2d at 1346. See supra notes 53-62.
82. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The district court's finding that Jelco, after full
disclosure, waived any objection to Meyer's dual representation complied with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a). Rule 52(a) requires the district court, when sitting without a jury, to state





The Ninth Circuit found the second part of DR-105(C), the obvious
adequate representation requirement, more difficult to apply. 4 The
Unified court rejected Porter's per se rule of disqualification 5 and held
that the mere possibility of inadequate representation does not abolish
the client's right to consent to dual representation of adverse interests
in every instance.86 The court in Unied emphasized that DR 5-
105(C)87 of the 1970 Code incorporated the consent provision of Canon
6 of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. 88 Moreover, the Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics has rebuffed proposals to delete the consent
clause.89 The court observed that in some cases adverse representation
would be inherently inadequate because of the nature of the conflicting
interests.90 Thus, Canon 5 only allows dual representation in excep-
tional situations that meet the requirements of DR 5-105(C). 9 t The
Unifed court held that the Code preserves an individual's right to
choose counsel and does not create a "paternalistic" per se rule forbid-
ding dual representation of adverse interests.9" The judiciary's role,
therefore, is to maintain an individual's right to choose counsel freely
and to disqualify attorneys when dual representation violates policy
considerations.93
The Unffed decision provided a workable definition for the require-
ments of obvious adequate representation. The court reasoned that
"obvious" is an objective standard94 and suggested several factors to
determine when representation of adverse interests is adequate. These
83. 646 F.2d at 1346 n.6. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F.
Supp. 193, 203-05, (N.D. Ohio 1976) (movant estopped from retroactively withdrawing consent),
afdmem, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978); supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
84. 646 F.2d at 1346-51.
85. 283 Or. 517, 528 n.5, 584 P.2d 744, 749 n.5 (1978) (en banc) (per curiam) (a showing of
adverse effect would preclude an attorney from ever obviously representing adverse clients ade-
quately). See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
86. 646 F.2d at 1347. See supra notes 61-62 & 69 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 54.
88. 646 F.2d 1347-49. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
89. 646 F.2d at 1349, 1349 n.13. See H. DRINKER, s.upra note 24, at 120 n.16. See supra notes
61-65 and accompanying text.
90. 646 F.2d at 1350. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
91. 646 F.2d at 1352. See supra note 54.
92. 646 F.2d at 1350.
93. Id. See supra notes 9 & 70.
94. 646 F.2d at 1348 n.12. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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factors include: (1) the nature of the litigation, (2) the kind of informa-
tion the attorney may have had access to, (3) whether the client knows
that multiple representation may be to his disadvantage and can pro-
tect his interests, and (4) the disputed questions.95
Applying these factors, the Unified court first found the nature of the
two cases in question to be quite different. The Ace litigation involved
a narrow issue of contract interpretation on undisputed facts. Un ifed,
however, involved factual allegations that each party delayed and in-
terfered with the order of concrete work on the same project. 6
Turning to the second factor, the court decided that attorney Meyer
obtained general insights and information from his representation of
Jelco. These helpful insights included Jelco's institutional attitudes
about negotiation, settlement, and business methods.97 Meyer, how-
ever, did not have access to specific information that would help Teep-
les prevail over Jelco.98 Furthermore, Jelco's general counsel fully
advised the prime contractor of the risks of dual representation before
Jelco retained Kobin & Meyer.9 9
After stating the general rule that an attorney should decline repre-
sentation when doubt exists concerning the propriety of dual represen-
tation, t°° the court in Unjfed criticized the practice of bringing suit
against an existing client.10 The court observed that in certain circum-
stances counsel could continue to represent the client, yet expose him-
self to disciplinary action for violations of the Code's sanctions.'0 2 The
court also recognized its duty to safeguard the public's expectation of
integrity in the judicial process.'0 3 Here, a finding of a lack of public
respect for attorneys was thought too speculative to override Teeples'
right to retain its chosen attorney because Jelco had full knowledge and
assumed all potential risks of dual representation."°4 The court held
that Meyer adequately represented each client. Meyer thus fulfilled the
95. 646 F.2d at 1350. See supra note 54.
96. 646 F.2d at 1351. See supra notes 3 & 5.
97. The court stated that this information is "always helpful in later suits against that client."
646 F.2d at 1351.
98. Id. See supra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
99. 646 F.2d at 1351. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
100. 646 F.2d at 1349, 1349 n.4. See Ethical Consideration 5-15 supra note 51. See supra note
69.
101. 646 F.2d at 1349. See supra note 47.
102. 646 F.2d at 1350 n.15. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
103. 646 F.2d at 1349. See supra notes 9, 24, 65 & 70-71.




second part of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C)'s test." 5 Judge Goodwin
dismissed the Canon 9 allegation, ruling that Canon 9 was not intended
to repeal impliedly the exceptional dual representations permitted by
Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C). 1°6
The Unfied court properly concluded that the Code does not create a
per se rule prohibiting dual representation of adverse interests in all
cases.' 07 The specific provisions of DR 5-105(C) permit clients to con-
sent to dual representation in exceptional cases. 1 8 It is illogical to con-
tend that the broad language of Canon 9 eliminates the specific
exception because dual representation of adverse interests is always in-
adequate. DR 5-105(C) is based on the premise that dual representa-
tion is permissible if the two-part test is met.'0 9
Unified aids the legal profession by enunciating guidelines for deter-
mining whether dual representation is obviously adequate pursuant to
the DR 5-105(C) exception." 0 The court's reasoning, however, is over-
broad in two respects. Un/fed implicitly holds that Jelco knowingly
waived its right to object to attorney Meyer's use of general informa-
tion potentially damaging to Jelco and that Meyer did not obtain spe-
cific, confidential information from Jelco."'I Confidential information,
however, cannot be used against a client, even if the client consents to
such use." 2 Furthermore, an opponent's settlement and negotiation
policy clearly provides an advantage for an attorney in litigation strat-
egy.'11 By classifying Jelco's negotiation and settlement policy as gen-
105. 646 F.2d at 1352. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
106. 646 F.2d at 1352. See supra notes 54 & 74.
107. 646 F.2d at 1344 n.3.
108. See supra note 54.
109, 646 F.2d at 1334 n.3. See supra notes 10, 53-56 & 74. A second argument supports the
contention that Canon 9 does not overrule DR5-105(C). This argument asserts that Canons ex-
press the general standards of professional conduct expected of attorneys. Noncompliance with a
Disciplinary Rule, but not a Canon, however, results in disciplinary action against the attorney.
Therefore, the Disciplinary Rule is more authoritative than a Canon and is not overruled thereby.
See CODE, supra note 2, Preliminary Statement. See supra notes 53-56 & 65.
110. 646 F.2d at 1350. See supra text accompanying note 95. The obviously adequate repre-
sentation inquiry is similar to Canon 4's substantial relationship standard. Id at 1350-51. The
court will inquire into some of the same factual considerations in deciding the obviously adequate
representation and substantial relationship tests. See supra notes 31-34 & 94-95 and accompany-
ing text.
111. 646 F.2d at 1351.
112. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 228 (7th Cir. 1978);
Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 273 (D. Del. 1980). See supra note 38-41 and
accompanying text.
113. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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eral rather than specific or confidential, however, the court in Un/fled
refused to find that advantage so unfair as to warrant
disqualification. 114
The judiciary should not broaden the scope of general information to
the detriment of the trust and confidence placed in the attorney-client
relationship." 5 In order for an attorney to function effectively the cli-
ent must feel free to relate all relevant information to counsel. A client
will not do so if he fears that sensitive general information, like his
settlement policy, could possibly be used against him in the future. 1
6
The Un/fled decision deviates from prior case law in one other signif-
icant respect. The court placed great emphasis on an individual's right
to choose counsel" 7 and mentioned only in passing the judiciary's duty
to maintain public confidence and respect for the legal system." 8 This
emphasis is misplaced. Although a client's right to choose counsel is
relevant in considering disqualification, the maintenance of public con-
fidence in the judicial system is paramount. 119 Courts should therefore
not extend Un/fled's questionable balancing of these policy considera-
tions. Furthermore, the broad reasoning in Un/fied implicitly condones
and encourages representation of interests adverse to those of an ex-
114. 646 F.2d at 1351.
115. See supra notes 21-24 and infra note 116 and accompanying text.
116. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam) (ensure open communication between attorney and client by precluding possibility of
misuse of confidential information); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d
Cir. 1972) (client should not fear confidences will be betrayed; client encouraged to reveal all
pertinent information to attorney), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (free flow of information vital to our system ofjustice);
In re Hedrick, 258 Or. 70, 74, 481 P.2d 71, 73 (1971) (en banc) (per curiam) (ethical prohibition
against disclosure fosters trust and confidence in attorney-client relationship).
117. 646 F.2d at 1350. The court stated that clients who are advised by counsel can properly
assume risks inherent in dual representation. Id.
118. Id. at 1349. See supra notes 9 & 24.
119. See supra notes 9, 24 & 70-71. The maintenance of judicial integrity is one justification
for the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendments search and seizure doctrine. A policy that
justifies suppressing reliable and relevant evidence from a criminal trial is more important than a
person's right to choose one particular attorney. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961)
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)); Savina Home Indus., Inc. v. Secretary
of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358, 1363 (10th Cir. 1979). Justice Brandeis stated in dissent in Olmstead v.
United States, 227 U.S. 438, 485 (1928): "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
Attorneys, as officers of the court, must also conduct themselves so that the public maintains
confidence in thejudicial system as a fair and effective forum to resolve disputes. To do otherwise




The Un//ed decision is significant for its refusal to adopt a per se
prohibition of dual representation of adverse interests and for its speci-
fication of the factors identifying obviously adequate dual representa-
tion. Unlike Un/fed, future courts should classify all information
detrimental to a former client as confidential, even if it is general in
nature. The judiciary also should not repeat Unifled's elevation of an
individual's right to choose counsel over the need to maintain public
respect for the legal system.
C.D.H.
120. 646 F.2d at 1349. The court observed that disciplinary action against an attorney, with-
out disqualification, might be sufficient to maintain public respect in judicial integrity. Discipli-
nary action, unlike disqualification, does not harm a client. The court did not address the
question whether disciplinary action would be appropriate here. In retrospect, Kobin & Meyer
should have complied with Ethical Consideration 5-15 and declined to represent Jelco, especially
if the nature of the potential dispute was such that litigation was inevitable. See 646 F.2d 1349,
1349 n.2, 1350 n.15. See also supra notes 21, 51 & 77.
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